China. However, China's experience with class action legislation and litigation illuminates both its experimental approach to law reform and the evolving roles of courts, individuals, and lawyers within the Chinese legal system. As China's leaders struggle to determine whether they can foster a law-based society without losing control, class actions provide a window on fundamental tensions in the Chinese legal system: between a government policy of increasing the importance of the courts, in part to force local officials to obey the law, and a system still inhospitable to plaintiffs; between government's desire to harness a market-driven legal profession to further law implementation and its desire to continue to regulate lawyers tightly; and between government efforts to shape the legal system and the plurality of factors that contribute to the evolution of that system. I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK China has one of the few legal systems outside the United States that permits class actions. 6 Although a number of countries have adopted procedures by which a representative may litigate on behalf of individuals with the same interests, 7 few countries other than the United States permit class actions for large or unidentified groups of plaintiffs. 8 Civil law nations have often rejected class actions because such proceedings run counter to traditional views of litigation as "a matter for individual enterprise," 9 unfairly bind individuals not party to an action, and overlook traditional distinctions between public and private.' 0 In contrast to many nations that have rejected class actions, China has a strong collective tradition. Disputes have often been resolved collectively and informally." Thus, although the prevalence of class actions suggests that group disputes are increasingly being resolved through formal legal mechanisms, 12 group dispute resolution itself is not an innovation. Additionally, Chinese courts have historically been inhospitable fora for adjudicating individual rights, 13 and individuals have often been reluctant to use the courts. 14 China's decision to provide courts with procedures for handling group disputes appears to have been animated both by a willingness to experiment and by functional concerns regarding the ability of the judiciary to handle an increasing number of multiparty disputes. China has repeatedly experimented in law reform by selectively adapting aspects of foreign legal systems.' 5 In the case of class actions, China appears to have drawn heavily on the American experience. 16 China's courts faced an increasing number of multiparty disputes in the late 198os, but lacked the procedures to handle them. 17 The courts' difficulties stemmed from the complexity of cases involving large numbers of litigants, and from courts' own lack of resources: many judges have little or no formal legal education,' and courts are underfunded, with their finances often controlled by the local government. 19 Despite the lack of formal procedures, some Chinese courts adjudicating multiparty disputes prior to i991 used procedures resembling those later included in the CPL. 20 In i985, for example, when 1569
Politics of Lodging Complaints in Rural China, CHINA Q., Sept. 1995, at 756, 756-57, 76o-61, 767 . 13 See Ross, supra note ii, at 16-17.
See ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA i68 (1992); see also WILLIAM C. JONES, THE GREAT QING CODE 10-l (1994) (noting that during the Qing Dynasty, legal proceedings "could be quite dreadful for everyone, including the complainant"). But see PHILIP HUANG, CIVIL JUSTICE IN CHINA 10-15 (1996) (arguing that there was a significant volume of civil litigation in Qing China). 15 See, e.g., Shen Zongling, Dangdai Zhongguo Jiejian Waiguo Falu De Shili (Shang) Sichuan farmers filed suit to enforce a seed contract, the court permitted them to select representatives to carry out the litigation. 2 1 In addition, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) and the State Council, China's chief executive and administrative body, authorized the use of class action procedures in at least three contexts.
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China's 1991 Civil Procedure Law separates class action litigation into two categories: cases in which the number of litigants is fixed, and cases in which the number is not known at the time the case is filed. Article 54 governs cases in which the number of litigants is fixed, and provides that in joint litigation 23 in which the number of parties on either side of the litigation is "large," such parties may choose one or more representatives to carry out the litigation. 24 The Supreme People's Court's official interpretation of the CPL defines "large" generally Article 55 governs cases in which the number of plaintiffs or defendants is not fixed. It provides that in cases in which many parties have similar claims, but the actual number of parties is not known at the time the case is filed, the court may issue a notice detailing the substance of the case and instructing all persons whose rights are similarly affected to register with the court within a specified period.
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The parties who register then may select one or more representatives. Both articles 54 and 55 provide that the actions of the representatives are binding on the represented parties. 29 However, the represented parties must consent to a change in the representative or to any decision by the representative to abandon the litigation, accept a demand of the opposing party, or settle the case. 30 Article 55 also provides that the court's decision is binding on all those who register with the court, and on those with similar interests who do not register but who bring suit within the prescribed litigation period. (Liang Shuwen, Hui Huming & Yang Rongxin eds., ig96) (stating that the CPL does not specify the procedures to be followed in class actions, but that the basic procedures can be inferred from the legislation's spirit and the SPC Interpretation). 33 The procedural flexibility courts possess may facilitate experimentation. Chinese courts "are less rigidly regulated by detailed technical rules or by a clear conceptual demarcation between the judicial and administrative functions" than are courts in the West. CHEN, supra note 14, at 112.
CPL produced a flurry of Chinese academic writing describing articles 54 and 55, and praising the procedures for increasing the efficiency of the judicial system 34 and helping to resolve complex cases, 35 there has been little academic analysis of actual cases. 
II. CLASS ACTION SUITS
Post-I991 class actions have been notably varied in character. They range from a suit brought by thirty-four plaintiffs against a company in which they had purchased preferred shares for failure to pay dividends, 3 7 to a suit brought by more than eighty airline passengers for damages suffered as a result of a delayed plane, 38 to a suit by students against the publisher and seller of low-quality legal textbooks. 3 9 Class actions appear to have been most common in disputes over low quality products, consumer fraud, environmental pollution, economic contracts, and local government actions.
In one high profile case, 30o Beijing consumers sued six Beijing department stores and watch wholesalers after purchasing watches marketed to celebrate the one hundredth anniversary of Mao Zedong's birth. 40 Advertisements for the watches had claimed that they were manufactured with gold and diamonds, but the watches were in fact low-quality imitations. 4 by twenty-six plaintiffs, 4 2 the Beijing Xuanwu District Court published an advertisement in the Beijing Evening News instructing all those who had purchased the watches and wished to participate in the litigation to register with the court. 4 3 At the conclusion of the trial, the court ordered the defendants to accept the return of the watches and refund the purchase price, to pay damages of 2700 to 3000 yuan 44 for each watch, and to pay fees and costs associated with the litigation.
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Peasants have brought numerous class actions for damages suffered from low quality fertilizers and seeds. 46 In Sichuan, for example, 6132 peasant households sued four defendants, including the seller and manufacturer of substandard fertilizer, for 2.3 million yuan after the fertilizer destroyed cotton crops. 4 7 Class actions arising from contractual and financial disputes include a successful suit by 146 peasants against a livestock company for reneging on a contract to pay the peasants to raise martens, 48 a suit for back pay, 49 and suits over the supply of natural gas to individual households. 
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Environmental class actions have included claims for harm suffered from air, 5 1 noise, 5 2 and water 5 3 pollution. In Liu Shiyou v. Xuzhou Fangting Liquor Factory, 5 4 eight village households brought suit against four companies that polluted the local river, killing thousands of ducks and fish that were the villagers' primary source of income. 55 The villagers won more than 700,000 yuan in damages. 5 6 China's Administrative Litigation Law, 5 7 which provides for suits challenging government action, does not explicitly permit class actions. 58 Nevertheless, plaintiffs have brought numerous administrative class actions, apparently borrowing the procedural framework of the Civil Procedure Law. 5 9 In Sichuan, for example, thirty-two house- The apparent rise in the number of class actions in China and the diversity of their subject matter illustrate a larger trend toward increased use of the courts to resolve disputes. China's courts heard approximately 16% more cases in 1996 than in 1995,62 continuing an expansion that began in the 1980s.63 This increase stems in part from a dramatic increase in disputes, particularly economic disputes, in reform-era China, 64 but also from a government policy of enhancing the importance of the courts and, consequently, litigation. 6 5 Litigation has grown at a much faster rate than mediation, 6 6 and traditional govern- 7,409,222 to 6,123,729. See YEARBOOK (1991) , supra, at 9s6; YEARBOOK (I995), supra, at 1o8. Similarly, the percentage of ment disdain for litigation has declined. 6 7 Class actions may further encourage the use of the courts. 6 8 The prospect of group action through class suits should reduce the traditional reluctance of individuals to use the courts, particularly in cases in which the defendant is a government department or enterprise or possesses significant economic clout.
6 9 Additionally, class actions may make litigation more economically feasible by allowing plaintiffs to pool their resources to hire counsel and cover litigation costs.
The precise reasons for the apparent official encouragement of litigation are unclear. Changing economic and social relationships mean that disputes increasingly involve parties who are at arm's length; mediation may be less effective in such circumstances.
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Governmentsponsored mediation may also be less effective in a society in which state control over individuals continues to decrease. Yet class actions also illustrate that increasing the role of courts in dispute resolution may grant the government a measure of control over disputes. For excivil cases brought in the courts that were resolved through court-supervised mediation decreased (1966) .
68 Despite increased litigation rates, there is little evidence concerning whether individuals are increasingly bringing suit in courts instead of, or in addition to, bringing their grievances to the relevant administrative authorities. Chinese academics comment that most people with grievances do not distinguish between courts and other government actors. See 1998 Academic Interview A; i996 Academic Interview Y. Evidence from class actions suggests that, although disputes are increasingly likely to be brought to the courts, there are no clear trends regarding whether such cases are brought in addition to, after, or in place of the filing of complaints with administrative departments. In many class actions, plaintiffs appear to resort to the courts only after complaints to the relevant administrative authorities fall. See, e.g suit brought after the local government failed to respond to plaintiffs' demands). In other cases, plaintiffs appear to pursue a dual-edged attack, using the courts and the administrative system concurrently. See, e.g., Li, supra note 41 (reporting that plaintiffs both complained to the government quality control association and filed suit). In still other cases, however, plaintiffs have filed suit without attempting to resolve their cases through administrative authorities, see, e.g., Yuan, supra note 38 (describing a suit filed without first complaining to the relevant administrative authority), or have been advised by administrative organs to sue, see 1996 Academic Interview Y.
69 For example, labor law experts state that in many cases in which workers bring successful complaints against their employers, the employers later punish the workers. Class actions also demonstrate that increased dispute resolution in China's courts may facilitate other government policies. The numerous class actions brought by peasants against local officials or local economic interests have coincided with a government campaign to lessen burdens on peasants. 7 2 Consumer class actions have appeared against the backdrop of a government effort to strengthen consumer rights and crack down on fraudulent products. Environmental class actions are consistent with government efforts to strengthen environmental protection. Although class actions often involve clashes with local policies, many class action plaintiffs are actually trying to force local authorities to follow national laws.
Yet functional weaknesses in the courts undermine the effectiveness of government efforts to enhance the importance of litigation and the courts. Such weaknesses are particularly evident in class actions, which, although designed to improve judicial efficiency, suffer from the limited competence and capacity of the courts. 7 3 Already suffering from a lack of resources, courts are required to assume new tasks: they must notify prospective class members, supervise the appointment of class representatives, and if plaintiffs are successful, oversee the distribution of awards to large numbers of individuals. As a result, many judges resist accepting class actions out of fear that the cases will be too complex. 7 4 Moreover, judges are often evaluated based on the number of cases they process, and thus are sometimes unwilling to take on a class action.
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Class actions also demonstrate that increasing the role courts play in resolving disputes also requires addressing disincentives to litigate. Chinese observers note that individuals are reluctant to assume risks associated with bringing a class action when the benefits of the action 71 See, e.g., Zhang & Wu, supra note 48, at S (stating that one case was a success in part because it resolved a dispute involving more than ioo people, with no detriment to social stability). Many disputes do appear to result in violence. See, e.g Court fees also discourage class actions. In most civil cases, plaintiffs must pay a filing fee, which is set according to the amount in dispute. 79 CPL article 107 permits courts to reduce or waive these fees when the courts deem it appropriate, 80 and the Supreme People's Court has stated that in class actions brought pursuant to CPL article 55, court fees shall be paid by the losing party. 8 ' Despite these provisions, lawyers who have litigated class actions say that they are wary of not paying the fees in advance because courts rely heavily on such fees; lawyers fear requests for waivers will bias judges against their clients. 8 2 Although in theory each class member is responsible for paying her share of court fees if the suit is unsuccessful, in practice the fee requirement discourages individuals from serving as class representatives for fear that they will be forced to pay all of the litigation fees if the class loses. 8 3 Court fees may also discourage cases in which each individual claim is small. 8 4 Additionally, representatives may incur a variety of other costs, including attorneys' fees, travel expenses, and costs associated with preparing evidence. 85 Moreover, the time and energy required of class representatives dissuades individuals from serving as representatives. Even when class action cases are brought, there are impediments to others joining the class. It is often difficult for class members to monitor the activities of their representatives.
8 7 Judges in some cases exacerbate such problems by not permitting plaintiffs to select their own representatives, instead assigning local officials to represent the class, even when such officials' interests clash with those of the people they are representing. 88 Further, affected individuals may not find out about actions that concern them. 9 Moreover, the ability of individuals who do not participate in the class action to reap the benefits of a successful verdict produces free riders, discouraging individuals from participating in collective suits. 90 The wide range of cases discussed in Part I indicates that individuals are willing to bring class actions despite multiple impediments. Nevertheless, the numerous difficulties plaintiffs confront in class suits demonstrate that the existence of class action procedures alone may not be sufficient to increase access to the courts dramatically. Tension between the government policy of increasing the courts' role in resolving disputes and the numerous barriers to effective use of the courts may be just one manifestation of the divergence of law and reality that plagues much of Chinese law, 9 1 but this tension may also reflect broader government ambivalence toward the potential consequences of widespread use of litigation. Sept. 2, 1994 , at 5 (stating that 612 of 855 consumers affected by a class action responded to a notice in the Jiangsu Legal System News). All class actions to date appear to be local, with notification given only in the area in which the case is filed.
90 See Liu, supra note 87, at 74 (arguing that individuals who did not register in the class action but who filed suit within the statute of limitations should have their award reduced by double the per capita litigation costs of those who registered). In one environmental class action, numerous plaintiffs refused to participate, stating that they would sue only if the class action were successful. See 1996 Lawyer Interview H; see also Lan, supra note 68, at 17 (suggesting that individuals originally unwilling to participate in class actions joined suit after it became apparent that the plaintiffs would win). 
IV. CONTROL OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT: THE LEGAL PROFESSION
The rise of class actions and the increase in litigation have coincided with the rapid growth of the Chinese legal profession. Class actions are almost certain to increase incentives for lawyers to undertake difficult cases. However, the strength of such incentives will depend both on China's regulation of lawyers' fees and on the specific roles lawyers are permitted to play in class action litigation.
The number of lawyers in China has risen from 3000 lawyers in 198092 to 100,200 in 1996. 93 This number is expected to reach i5o,ooo by the year 2000.94 Concurrently, lawyers have become increasingly profit-driven. China first permitted lawyers to organize into nonstate law firms in i988,95 but until the promulgation of the 1996 Lawyers Law 96 all lawyers remained "state legal workers." 97 Lawyers are now largely free to choose their own cases, and to run their law practices as quasi-businesses.
Despite this growth, most cases in China are litigated without the assistance of counsel, 98 and lawyers ostensibly remain subject to strict fee regulation. Such regulation has caused lawyers to avoid complex or difficult cases.
99 Fees for legal services are fixed at low levels; for example, fees for economic cases and civil cases involving property are Lawyers' roles in class actions also determine their incentives to undertake such cases. Lawyers who are able to expand the size of the class, and thus the amount in controversy, will be more willing to assume complex cases. However, it is unclear to what extent lawyers can legally encourage litigation or expand plaintiff groups. Some lawyers have openly worked to expand the size of plaintiff classes; 110 in other cases, such as the Mao watch case, lawyers appear to have waited for the court to issue a notice to those whose rights were potentially implicated in the action."'
The divergence between theory and practice in legal fees reflects continuing ambivalence regarding the appropriate role of lawyers in China. China appears committed to making both courts and lawyers more accessible and to bringing increasing numbers of disputes into the formal legal system, but remains uncomfortable with providing the financial incentives required to encourage lawyers to undertake complex cases. Thus, the development of class actions is important in part for the possibility that even if legal fees continue to be tightly regulated, significant financial opportunities may exist where numerous claims are combined into one action."
2 Such incentives may be particularly important in labor, environmental, and consumer cases, areas currently unattractive to many Chinese lawyers. 110 For example, after more than ten peasants contacted lawyers regarding a contract dispute, the lawyers not only wrote to 75 other potential plaintiffs whose names were listed on the disputed contract, but also wrote an article in the local newspaper regarding the litigation. See Zhang & Wu, supra note 48; see also Yuan, supra note 38 (reporting that lawyers on a delayed flight organized the other passengers to sue the airline).
I 1 See Li & Zhong, supra note 40. 112 Other factors, most notably the availability of large damage awards, may also increase a lawyer's willingness to assume difficult cases. The amount in controversy in economic and administrative cases has continually increased over the past decade. See YEARBOOK (1996) 113 Lawyers comment that the complexity and unlikelihood of victory make such cases unattractive. For example, a lawyer who litigated an environmental class action in Jiangsu commented that the case not only pitted him against powerful economic interests, but also necessi-Class actions may also suggest a shifting role for lawyers as they are drawn to cases with potentially large social impacts. The increased willingness of lawyers to challenge powerful local interests suggests that increased financial incentives may accelerate the development of a more independent legal profession, as lawyers become increasingly willing to undertake cases in which they clash with local governments. However, lawyers in such cases are not always at odds with the state: they may also be acting to force local governments or industries to obey national laws. Thus, even as China's lawyers move away from their roles as state legal workers, class actions suggest that lawyers may be assuming more active positions in the project of law implementation.
The development of class actions has coincided with China's attempts to increase access to legal advice through the construction of a legal aid system.1 4 Government discussion of legal aid to date has focused in part on the responsibility of the legal profession to provide assistance to those who cannot afford lawyers. Lawyers in some cities are now required either to pay for legal aid programs or to handle a certain number of pro bono cases annually. 15 The development of 116 Interviews at four of China's leading legal aid centers in the summer of 1996 revealed that the centers had conducted a total of one class action. See 1996 Government Interview P; 1996 Government Interview Q; 1996 Lawyer Interview B; 1996 Lawyer Interview H.
117 It is too early to tell whether class actions will become a significant focus of China's legal aid providers. The development of class actions by legal aid providers will likely depend on the degree to which non-government legal aid providers are able to operate in China. Those lawyers interested in class actions thus far have been at university-based, non-government legal aid centers; government-funded legal aid centers have largely focused on individual civil and criminal cases. See Liebman, supra note i 14, at 88-go.
Even a well-developed legal aid system will be able to provide assistance to only a fraction of those in need of legal help. The development of class action litigation in China suggests that, given appropriate incentives, profit-seeking lawyers may be willing to take on many of the complex cases that otherwise would be brought without lawyers or would not be brought at all.
More importantly, however, the development of class action litigation suggests that a market-driven legal profession may be essential not just to increasing access to China's courts, but also to the project of law implementation. Legal aid has developed in part because it is consistent with the central government's desire to harness the legal profession to force disputes into the legal system, and thus to increase compliance with national laws. Yet the continued strict regulation of legal fees reflects China's reluctance to recognize that increased financial incentives to lawyers may serve the same goals; indeed, legal aid is also a response to the perceived excesses of a newly market-driven legal profession. The development of class actions suggests that China's ability to use the legal profession to increase law implementation may be contingent on a willingness to grant lawyers financial incentives, which in turn requires accepting a role for lawyers largely independent of local and national government control.
Friction between the government's desire to use the newly marketdriven legal profession to further law reform and its desire to continue tight regulation of lawyers reflects a larger question: to what degree can China both direct disputes into and control the evolution of the formal legal system? The class actions described in Part II are largely consistent with the political values most likely to have been responsible for China's decision to permit class actions: the desires to steer disputes into the formal legal system, to expedite redress for certain existing collective interests, and to facilitate certain policy goals. Yet China's experience with class actions also hints that class actions in China may serve to organize otherwise unconnected individuals. As lawyers increasingly seek plaintiffs, they may be organizing individuals who would not otherwise act in concert. It remains to be seen whether the creation of such new collective interests will lead lawyers and plaintiff groups to pursue goals in tension with those of the state.' 1 8 V. CONCLUSION Class actions in China differ from individual actions not only in the number of persons involved, but also in their results. Even unsuccessful cases or unenforceable decisions may have beneficial results. Many press accounts of class actions have noted the role such cases play in raising the legal awareness of both the litigants and society. 119 The filing of a suit may at times be sufficient to attract the interest of higher-level authorities, 120 or simply to pressure local officials and courts. Such consequences are particularly important given the difficulties courts face in enforcing judgments 121 and the power local authorities often have over local courts. 22 Class actions may also force judges and other authorities to confront cases and areas of law that might otherwise be ignored. 123 Thus, although class actions are part of the general growth of litigation, they may also be more influential than other forms of litigation. Yet it is unclear whether the government intends such effects or whether they are, at least in part, an outgrowth of granting new incentives for raising collective grievances.
Class actions also demonstrate that plaintiffs may increasingly be using law to pursue their own interests and to force government action. Lawyers and litigants are doing this not only by bringing lawsuits, but also by combining lawsuits with petitioning of administrative organs and appeals to the press. Such strategies appear to be successful in part because they are consistent with state approaches to law implementation. Law in the People's Republic has never been a matter solely for the courts or the bureaucracy, and lawyers who pursue cases through the press or who file suit to pressure local authorities are taking advantage of the same mechanisms the government uses to disseminate law. The ability of class action litigants to do this reflects a system in which the state's use of law to exert control and pursue specific policy goals may be best served by allowing lawyers and litigants increased incentives and flexibility. The continued development of class action litigation may reflect not only the evolution of the state's approach toward law, but also that the ways in which litigants use the legal system to pursue their own interests may be increasingly important in shaping the evolution of law in China.
119 See, e.g., Huang & Xiao, supra note 51 (claiming that a class action increased understanding of environmental law); Yuan, supra note 38 (stating that the filing of a class action had an influence on people's understanding of law and on the quality of airline service).
120 See, e.g., Wang, supra note 59 (describing intervention by the governor and the provincial environmental bureau, and the closing of a polluting factory, after 4853 villagers sued the local environmental bureau).
121 See supra pp. 1533-35 (discussing implementation problems facing class actions); see also Lan, supra note 68, at 16 (questioning whether a court judgment would be ignored by the defendant, a local government).
122 For example, a lawyer who litigated an environmental class action stated that the case was resolved against the plaintiffs when the mayor intervened on behalf of the defendant industries. See 1996 Lawyer Interview H.
123 Cf. i996 Lawyer Interview H (describing as a success a court's willingness to hear an environmental class action, and noting that the case was likely to increase awareness of environmental issues regardless of the outcome).
